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Comparative Law Scholarship
By JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN*
Most comparative lawyers know that their field enjoys, or endures, what generous observers might praise as a healthy scholarly
pluralism but more knowledgeable people decry as the sort of schol-

arly confusion that results from a paradigm crisis.' This is old news.!
Recently, however, it has begun to appear that something new and
interesting may be happening in comparative law. Eminent senior
and interesting younger scholars seriously discuss the field, find that
it lacks form and direction, and propose thoughtful ways of dealing
with its problems.
* Rudi Schlesinger, a good friend and a stimulating colleague, would have disagreed vigorously and ably with parts of this article and would have delighted in
pointing out its errors and shortcomings to me. I am grateful for help in its preparation from David S. Clark, Lawrence Friedman, Mark Kelman, Dan Klerman, Victor
H. Li, the Stanford Law Library staff, and my research assistant, Andrew M. Jackson.
1. The terms "paradigm" and "confusion" are used in the sense given them in
THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1979). The
dominant mode of comparative law scholarship is a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense
that it establishes the way individuals organize their work and the way they determine what kinds of questions are legitimate.
2. I do not address another bit of old news in this article: that most of what
most comparative lawyers do is better thought of as description (of foreign law) than
as comparison. When comparison occurs, it is usually there as an aid to description.
Scholars who describe their field as Japanese law or Chinese law or Latin American
law more accurately represent what they are about than those of us who call ourselves comparative lawyers.
3. Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the "Rectification of Names"
in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19 (1996); William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REv. 945 (1986); Vivian
Grosswald Curran, CulturalInmmersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence
(I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889 (1995) [hereinafter
What Was It Like to Try a Rat?]; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (If):
The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. CoMp. L. 489 (1995) [hereinafter The
Logic of Legal Transplants]; Gtinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: ReThinking Comparative Law, 26 HARv. INT'L LJ.411 (1985); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging,45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996); RODOLFO
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At this writing, however, confusion still prevails. Writers employ
varying conceptions of "law," ranging from legal texts to legal systems (of which more below), and contrasting modes of scholarship,
which I will for convenience collapse into professional and academic.
By professional comparative law scholarship I mean the sort of work
that is principally of interest and value to lawyers, judges and legislators professionally engaged in dealing with concrete legal questions.
Academic scholarship can be divided into humanistic and scientific.
Humanistic scholarship is in the tradition of philosophical, historical
and literary description, narrative, interpretation, analysis and criticism. I use scientific to refer to scholarship that seeks to educe generalizations that can be used as the basis for explanations of and predictions about social-legal behavior.4 These are categories of
convenience and are not mutually exclusive; a book or article may
express both professional and academic interests and may combine
humanistic and scientific modes of scholarship. There may well be
forms of comparative law scholarship that fit into none of these rubrics, although most of the work that one encounters can be crammed
into one or the other of them without significant procrustean distortion.
Professional comparative law, whether in the form of advice and
expertise on specific problems or for more general edification in
published books and articles, needs little further comment. It is a
useful kind of activity, and most academic comparative lawyers do
some of it. My focus here is on academic scholarship in comparative
law. I distinguish between text-centered and system-centered scholarship and briefly consider their relative merits as models for future
comparative law scholarship.

SACCO, CHE COS't IL DIRITrO COMPARATO? [WHAT IS COMPARATIVE LAW?] (1992);

Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM.

J. COMP. L. 1, 343 (1991-1992); Martin Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigmand Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative
Law, 47 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 495 (1998).
4. For discussions see John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Scientific
Explanation, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND

TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 81 (John N. Hazard & Wenceslas J. Wagner eds.,

1974) and

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND
SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY (1979).
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I. Texts
We begin with comparative law scholarship that identifies law
with authoritative texts. The most common such texts are rules of
law, or what civil lawyers often refer to as legal norms. Professor
H.L.A. Hart usefully distinguishes rules of law into primary rules of5
obligation, which equate with substantive rules and secondary rules.
It is the primary rules of obligation that have attracted most of the
interest of comparative law scholars, and I will refer to this kind of
text-centered scholarship as "rule-comparison." In the terminology
of rule-comparison, in a tradition that includes the Institutes of Gaius
and Justinian, an "institution" becomes a structured body of rules:
the institution of contract; the institution of property, and "legal system" is commonly used to refer to the body of rules in force in a nation or jurisdiction.
Text-based comparison has a long, honorable history. Among
the high points, Aristotle and Solon were famous early practitioners.
In Italy during the revival of Roman legal studies, rule-study was the
natural method to understand, systematize and adapt authoritative
Roman and canon law texts, the "barbaric" versions of Roman law
applied to the Italic populations under the Goths and Franks, and the
local laws of cities, duchies and communes. The Democratic Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries introduced an extraordinary period of legislative hyper-activity and intensive comparative study of texts. The American and French Revolutionary
legal reforms were widely admired, studied, emulated and adapted in
other nations. Former colonies in Latin America borrowed from the
United States and France and others in establishing their own national legal systems. Italy and Germany coalesced into nation-states
and created national legal systems. The comparative study of texts
was a natural and important part of this heightened period of lawmaking activity, which was marked by establishment of the Societe de
Legislation Compare in France and the Society of Comparative Legislation in England, evidencing the widely held assumption that rules
of law were the proper object of comparative study and legislation
their appropriate form. "General principles of law" derived from the
study of rules achieved wide acceptance as guides to interpretation of
legislation and as instruments of legal science. Savigny and the His-

5. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
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torical School explicitly recognized and studied Germanic and Roman texts as sources of European law. German legal science sought
to construct an allgemeine Rechtslehre or General Theory of Law
from the study of rules.
Rule-comparison continued into the twentieth century with the
great American treatises and the Restatement of the Law. (On matters of state law American lawyers have been compelled by the federal system to be comparative lawyers, and Williston on Contracts,
Wigmore on Evidence and the Restatement all are based on comparative study of state [rules of] law). At the international level, the
European Union treaties call for the "approximation" of laws among
the member nations. The Statute of the International Court of Justice lists "general principles of law recognized among civilized nations" as a source of law. Rudolf Schlesinger's Common Core of Legal Systems project6 is an attempt to derive general principles of
contract law from the study of the rules in a number of nations.
Finally, when one reads the works of leading contemporary
theorists of comparative law one finds a strong tendency to treat rules
as the sole or primary substance of comparative legal studies. Thus,
Rodolfo Sacco7 and Giinter Frankenberg" on one side of the Atlantic
and Alan Watson 9 on the other. Among the younger scholars, William Ewald has given the topic the most extended attention. While
criticizing, among other things, scholarly attention to rules, 10 he appears to derive the principles he proposes to identify and study from
such rules."
6. PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL., FORMATION OF CoNTRAcrs: A STUDY OF THE
COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968).
7. Sacco, CHE COS't IL DIRITrO COMPARATO?, supra note 3; Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to ComparativeLaw, supra note 3.
8. Frankenberg, supra note 3.
9. "Comparative Law then, as an academic discipline in its own right, is a study
of the relationship, above all the historical relationship, between legal systems or between the rules of more than one system." ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 9 (2d ed. 1993).
10. "[Fjor the purposes of comparative law, law is best viewed not as a collection
of rules, nor as a device for maximizing the wealth of the society, nor as the commands of the sovereign, nor as a collection of timeless truths about the universe, but
as a kind of conscious mental activity, and above all as a record of the attempts, by
jurists, in light of their conception of law, to strive at the correct answers to legal
questions." Ewald, What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, supra note 3, at 1948-49; see also
Ewald, The Logic of Legal Transplants,supra note 3 (accepting and justifying rule
comparison).
11. See Ewald, What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, supra note 3. At various points
Ewald states that he is interested not only in rules but in principles, and he occasion-
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H. Systems
I contrast texts with systems, and we begin with a problem of
terminology. Though widely used, the term "legal system" has no
generally agreed content and means different things to different people. As we have seen, it is often taken to mean the body of rules of
law in force in a given nation or jurisdiction and thus is frequently
employed in rule-based comparative scholarship. For lack of an acceptable alternative, I use the same term but give it a different
meaning.
The catch-phrase ubi societas ibi is can be read to express two
propositions. The first is obvious: where there is society there is law.
The other, implied by the first, is that law is a social artifact; the legal
system is an expression of the social system. Accordingly, by "legal
system" I mean the complex of social actors, institutions and processes referred to by members and observers of a society as "legal" or
"juridical" or as directly related to or forming part of "law" or "the
legal system" or "the juridical order." These interrelated people, institutions and processes constitute a social subsystem that is that society's legal system. The humanistic and scientific description and
comparison of legal systems, as so defined, is a challenging and liberating enterprise for academic comparative law scholarship.
To describe legal systems and assess the nature and significance
of their similarities and differences, we need an apparatus of concepts. I offer the following apparatus, which is only one plausible
way to analyze the attributes and components of legal systems for deally refers to processes, but he remains rule-focused: "The goal is to understand the
foreign legal system; to do so one must uncover the reasons and justifications that
underlie the legal rules; and this task requires philosophy." Id. at 1948. "[W]e need
to know more than just the legal rules, but what else do we need? Certainly also the
underlying principles, that is, the characteristic underlying pattern of justifications
and reasons ... for the surface rules." Id. at 1940 (emphasis supplied). At other
points in his long but impressive article Ewald sounds like the Pandectist Wind-

scheid: "[I]f comparative law is viewed ... as the study of the internal principles
that govern a foreign legal system, it can offer a more plausible and more intrinsic
justification for its existence." Id. at 2147. The key word in that quotation is "internal." There is an interesting response to Ewald in Joachim Zekoll, Kant and Comparative Law-Some Reflections on a Refornm Effort, 70 TUL L. REv. 2719 (1996).

12. Ewald, What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, supranote 3, at 1896-97, appears to
differ, preferring to emphasize the "particularly close connection between comparative law and legal philosophy .... [C]omparative studies grounded in economics or
sociology or any other descriptive social science, although they may be helpful, are of
subordinate interest: they do not get to the heart of the matter." Id. And see

Ewald's characterization and rejection of what he calls "mirror theories of law" in his
article, The Logic of Legal Transplants,supra note 3, at 492.
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scription and comparison:
A. Legal Extension
In every society, much of what goes on is regulated not by law,
but by custom, tradition, social convention and peer influence, or is
left to individual autonomy. In every society the resulting line between the legal and the non-legal is drawn differently. Legal extension is the social reach of the legal system, the area of social activity
to which it attempts or purports to apply. The commonly-heard
statement that the United States is heavily legalized, that almost
every event or relationship or activity has significant legal implications, is a statement about legal extension.
B. Legal Penetration
A number of socially plural nations are also legally plural: they
have official national legal systems that may purport to apply to everyone but in practice have limited impact on the lives of significant
segments of the population and are a dominant presence only within
specific areas, in some nations perhaps only in a cosmopolitan enclave in the capitol. Elsewhere the official national legal system does
not penetrate at all or exists in active competition with traditional or
local law, as in a number of African, Asian and Latin American nations. Legal penetration is the social grasp of the legal system. Legal
extension and penetration are social dimensions of the legal system.
C. Legal Culture
Law is, among other things, a cultural expression; ideas about
law are a deeply rooted, historically conditioned component of the
culture. Such ideas powerfully limit and direct thinking about what
law is and about the proper composition and operation of the legal
system. Legal culture can be thought of as the inner logic of the legal
system. 3

13. As a convention, I use "legal culture" when referring to a specific legal system and "legal tradition" when referring to a historically related group of legal systems, as in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADMON (2d ed. 1987). For
interesting recent discussions of legal culture, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Is There a
Modem Legal Culture?, 7 RATIO JuRIS 117 (1994); Volkmar Gessner, Global Legal
Interaction and Legal Cultures, 7 RATnO JuRis 132 (1994).
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D. Legal Institutions
Courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, police departments,
law schools, legal research institutes and bar associations are familiar
examples of legal institutions. They are the composite units that
maintain, perpetuate and carry on the daily work of the legal system.
E. LegalActors
These are the legal roles played by people, such as attorneys/advocates, notaries, police, prosecutors, judges and judicial personnel, administrative officials, law professors/scholars, litigants and
so on.

F. Legal Processes
These are the activities performed by legal institutions and actors: the private ordering of legal relations, legislation, judicial and
administrative proceedings, legal scholarship and legal education.
G. Secondary Rules
These are rules that define and direct legal institutions, actors
and processes, such as rules of jurisdiction and procedure, and rules
about rules, those that govern the creation, interpretation and application of primary rules of obligation.
H. Legal Expense
This is what it costs the society to establish, maintain and operate the legal system.
Each of these variables seeks to capture a different aspect of the
legal system. Legal systems of the world all differ in greater or lesser
measure along each variable. Taken together the variables provide a
systematic apparatus for describing, characterizing and comparing legal systems and draw attention to important but neglected opportunities for academic comparative law scholarship. I expect that interested readers will quickly think of ways to improve and develop this
apparatus or will suggest entirely different but similarly motivated alternatives to it.
MI[. Rules, Systems and the Law Machine
Substantive rules of law-the kind that Professor Hart has called
"primary rules of obligation"--are prominently absent from my list
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of legal system variables. The reason is that there is art important
sense in which such rules are primarily of social, rather than legal,
significance. The point can be illustrated by the metaphor of the law
machine. Like other machines, the law machine is designed to perform work-in this case, legal work-in response to instructions. The
operator of the machine supplies the appropriate instruction and the
machine, if properly designed and powered, performs it.
Primary rules of obligation can be thought of as instructions to
the law machine. Most civil codes are primarily composed of such
rules. An example is article 1382 of the French Civil Code, to the effect that one who unjustifiably injures another is liable for compensation. But suppose that X, a manufacturer, distributes a defective
product that unjustifiably injures Y; it does not necessarily follow
that Y will be compensated. Some legal work must be done in order
to bring about the intended result. The law machine must be set into
operation, in this case by Y bringing the appropriate action against X
in the appropriate court. Eventually, if the machine functions properly, an official judgment will be issued to the effect that X owes Y a
certain amount of money as compensation. If X does not pay, Y can
make a further demand on the law machine to have X's property
seized and sold in order to satisfy the judgment. Again, if the machine functions properly, and if X has property within the court's jurisdiction that can be seized and sold for this purpose, Y may be paid.
It is extremely important that the society have appropriate primary rules of obligation, and the determination of what kinds of consequences should attach to people's acts or omissions is a very complicated and often controversial process. Such questions, however,
are not primarily legal questions; they are economic, social and political questions. For example, returning to French Civil Code article
1382, the question whether X should have the obligation to compensate Y if X damages Y is not a legal question. The distinction is
clearly made in a discussion of product liability by Professor Robert
Dorfman, an economist:
Now I can see clearly enough that there is a significant social
issue here. People occasionally suffer loss or injury as a consequence of the performance of articles that they have purchased.
And it is often a matter of deep human significance to decide who
should bear what part of the burden in such cases and to have a
policy on which such decisions can be based.
I call that a social problem, rather than a legal one, because it
concerns social relationships, although the solution to the problem
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may be contained in the law. There is an economic problem or
question related to this social problem.... [T]he solution of the
economic problem has a bearing on the social problem, for we
should certainly want to resolve the social problem in the best possible way, meaning by this the way in which all the consequences,
including importantly the economic ones, are as favorable as possible. That states clearly enough for me how the economist gets into
the picture, and what the social and economic questions are. But
what I perceive only vaguely is where the legal problem lies.14

I have purposely exaggerated the distinction between the legal
system and primary rules of obligation in order to clarify an important difference between system-based and text-based comparative
law. Of course it would be artificial and misleading to insist on a rigorous separation of primary legal rules from the legal system. The
primary rules assume and often are produced by the system. Much of
the work of the system is concerned with the enforcement, interpretation and application of primary rules. A legal system without primary rules to apply, or primary rules with no legal system to apply
them, both are incomplete notions. In any functioning society one
can infer something about the legal system from an examination of its
primary rules, and vice versa.
Still, what is "legal" about a primary rule is that it assumes or
calls into play the legal system. It is the legal system that does the legal work of the society, that determines how and to what extent the
precept stated in the primary rule will be translated into social consequences. When we study primary legal rules we are studying what
the society wants to achieve. The mere request or proposal will affect
social behavior to some extent (although we know very little about
the nature and intensity of that effect). But the social consequences
of the request result primarily from the operation, actual or anticipated, of the legal system.
Once we begin to think in this way about rules we cannot avoid
facing important group of what can be called "conversion questions."

IV. Conversion Questions
We have seen that the question whether a manufacturer should
be responsible to the user for damage caused by defective products is
primarily a social rather than a legal question. Suppose that there
14. Robert Dorfman, The Economics of Product Liability: A Reaction to
McKean, 38 U. CI. L. REv. 92, 93 (1970).
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were a clear social consensus that the manufacturer should be responsible. Whether and how that consensus should be converted into
a legal obligation raises a separate, important category of what may
be called "conversion" questions. The obvious first such question is
whether it is socially desirable to use the legal system to try to effectuate the policy at all, but there are many others: If the legal system
is to be used, how shall it be used? What legal system components
shall be employed in what ways? What adjustments in 'the legal system should be made in order for it to respond to this new demand?
What additional social investment will be required to enable the legal
system to respond appropriately to this added demand? Such conversion questions raise important issues of social-legal policy. Another kind of conversion question arises out of the constant process
of social change: population increase; urbanization; industrialization
and technological change; changes in health, education, wealth, leisure and quality of life; and so on. How are such social changes
communicated to the legal system? What are or should be their legal
system consequences?
In an ideal society, such questions of social-legal policy might be
expressly confronted and systematically resolved by legislatures as
they consider proposals for the enactment of new primary rules and
by courts that are considering whether to promote a desired social result by expansive or restrictive interpretation of existing legal norms.
In practice, however, the conversion of social policy into law usually
goes on without serious attention to such questions, in part because
there is no adequate and convenient body of theory and data to deal
with them. The good law professional-the lawyer or judge or notary-will have a practiced feel for the legal system that enables him
to act as effectively and responsibly as the limited information and
theory that are available to him permit. The legislator will to some
extent be guided by the legislative infrastructure of law revision
commissions, legislative research organizations and drafting services
and by the representations made by or for interested people and organizations during the legislative process. But neither the lawyer,
judge nor legislator is in a position to give sustained, systematic attention to basic questions of social-legal policy. That is the sort of work
that one could expect to be done by scholars. Like other social-legal
questions, conversion questions would appear to lend themselves to
fruitful comparative study.
The description and comparison of legal systems, more or less as
I have described them, and the related study of social-legal conver-
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sion questions are plausible objects of future comparative law scholarship, to which I now turn.
V. The Future of Comparative Law Scholarship
In addressing the future one may speak in terms of prediction or
of preference. I will do a little bit of both.
First, an easy prediction: professional scholarship in comparative
law will continue to thrive as a useful activity because lawyers and
judges will continue to require information and understanding about
foreign law in order to do their professional work. Another but
slightly more complicated prediction: much academic scholarship in
comparative law will continue to be rule-based. This apparently
bland prediction calls for explication.
A case can be made for the proposition that the reigning rulebased style of academic scholarship in comparative law in the West,
although it has ancient historical roots, is more immediately an artifact of nineteenth century European origin. It arose out of a preoccupation with legislation to consolidate the achievements of the
Revolution and to provide legal systems for the new nations. It acquired academic prominence and cachet in the work of German legal
science and solidified into a stable comparative law tradition in
European universities. When Rudolf Schlesinger and other expatriate scholars came to the United States in the 1930s and 40s and occupied academic posts in American law schools, they brought that tradition with them and propagated it through their teaching and
scholarship. Since there was no strong competing native comparative
law tradition, the European model met little resistance and quickly
dominated the comparative law landscape in the United States.
Some observers might wonder how rule-based comparative law
could have invaded the home of legal realism and rule-skepticism
without significant opposition. In fact, with the sole exception of a
brief article containing a frequently quoted statement by Professor
Myres McDougal,' there is little evidence that the any of the realists
paid serious attention to comparative law. Their attentions were focused internally, on American law, economy, society and politics.
Thus the revolution that swept through American public and private
15. "The greatest confusion continues to prevail about what is being compared,
about the purposes of comparison, and about appropriate techniques." Myres
McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification

as an Instrument of World Order,1 AM. J. COMP. L 24,28-29 (1952).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 21:771

law and, significantly, conflict of laws in the 1920s to :1950s left no
strongly visible mark on comparative law scholarship. The next turn
of the realist screw, critical legal studies, although it had foreign adherents and cosmopolitan American practitioners, seems again to
have paid little attention to or to have been significantly affected by
comparative law.
It is hardly surprising that many comparative scholars are comfortable with the study of texts. That is their paradigm, what they
and others with whom they identify have learned to do. Some of
them are unaware of or uninterested in thinking about its limitations.
There is no clearly posed alternative, no apparent clash of competing
paradigms, no perceived necessity of choice.
Others, however, are restless. They perceive that rule-based
scholarship has declined into a spent, static enterprise whose potential for significant academic productivity is exhausted. Its contemporary practitioners appear to them to be employing their impressive
abilities to crochet antimacassars, when they might be weaving great
tapestries. Although clever, learned people will always find clever,
learned things to say about anything they study; the opportunity cost
of a continued academic focus on rules seems to these critics to be
high. Much of the scholarly work in comparative law that they find
most interesting now falls outside the rule-study paradigm.
Our scholarly vision arguably is constricted in other ways. To
those of us in academia, professional and academic comparative law
live together in an uneasy relationship. We have seen that professional comparative law by its nature is rule-centered. As professional
comparatists we are uniquely situated to help lawyers, judges and
law-makers who wish to know what the foreign rules are and how
they are applied. We are also, however, engaged in an academic enterprise and are uniquely situated to preserve, enrich and transmit
learning in our field through our teaching and scholarship. These
professional and academic activities can be mutually supportive, but
their co-existence creates hazards. All law professors are familiar
with the complaint of practicing lawyers that much of our professional writing is too "theoretical" or "impractical" or "academic."
For comparative lawyers, however, there is an obverse possibility:
Habituation to the professional focus on rules can easily carry over
without reflection into academic scholarship. A disturbing effect of
the professional/academic symbiosis has been a tendency toward
what might be called the "professionalization" of our academic work,
the seductive notion that satisfaction of professional scholarly objec-
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tives also fulfills our academic responsibilities.
There is an additional concern: in the United States, the attention of mainstream comparative law teaching and scholarship has
been on French and German law, which were familiar to Rudolf
Schlesinger and the other influential emigre scholars who were
mainly responsible for the comparative law renaissance in U.S. law
schools in the 1940s and 50s. Germany's most important contribution
to the civil law was German legal science, a body of legal scholarship
based on rules, and France's most widely admired contribution was
the Code Civil, composed of rules. That France and Germany were
strategically and economically important to the United States helped
to justify an academic, as well as professional, emphasis on their primary rules. That those nations were culturally familiar and accessible
to us helped solidify what has become a strong academic tradition.
Of the four leading comparative law casebooks currently in use in
American law schools, three perpetuate that tradition by taking
French and German law to embody or typify the civil law. Thus we
can, with some justice, characterize the mainstream of academic
comparative law scholarship as suffering from a sort of double impediment: An academic vision narrowed to rules joined with a drastic reduction of the historical richness and contemporary diversity of
the civil law tradition to modern French and German law.
VI. The Escape from the Text
Escape to what? The question is not so much how to escape
from the text as it is where to go next. I would argue, predictably,
that the opportunities for resuscitation of academic comparative law
scholarship lie in the humanistic and/or scientific study of legal systems and their components and related social-legal conversion questions. My description earlier in this article of an apparatus of concepts that could be employed in pursuing that kind of comparative
law is a crude and inadequate but suggestive first effort.
Another escape route is through greater appreciation and emulation of the body of scholarship produced by scholars who have
worked outside the text-based paradigm. Here, with sincere apologies to others whose work might have been mentioned, are a few illustrative examples beyond the obvious but indispensable Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Weber: Lawyers in Society (Richard L. Abel
& Philip C. Lewis eds., 1988); Harold J. Berman, Law and Revohltion: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983); Erhard
Blankenburg, Mobilisierung von Recht (1987); Access to Justice
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(Mauro Cappelletti general ed., 1978-1979); Mirjan Dama'ka, The
Faces of Justice and State Authority: A ComparativeApproach to the
Legal Process (1986); John P. Dawson, Oracles of the Law (1968);
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority and
Culture (1990) and other works; John Owen Haley, Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox (1991); Inga Markovits,
Imperfect Justice: An East-West German Diary (1995); any of a number of studies by Rogelio P6rez Perdomo; James Q. Whitman, The
Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era (1990). A survey of academic scholarship in journal articles would add an impressive number of names to the list. A substantial body of interesting
and important academic comparative law scholarship already exists
outside the text-based tradition, offering hope and inspiration to
those who find mainstream scholarship narrow, repetitive and uninspiring.
VII. Conclusion
This diagnosis of the causes of the evident ill health of our discipline undoubtedly contains errors, excesses and omissions, for which
I apologize to readers and colleagues whom I may unintentionally
have offended. I am confident, however, that in general outline the
diagnosis is sound. Comparative law languishes in a narrow dungeon
of its own construction, deprived of light and air by a perversely constricted academic vision, its growth stunted by a diet of rules while
rich nourishment lies within easy reach. The remedy is too obvious
to require extended explication: Law is much more than primary
rules. The civil law tradition is only one legal tradition, and its dimensions far exceed those of modem French and German law. We
have an academic mission that reaches well beyond professional
scholarship. Within these parameters lies the future of our discipline.

